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Democracy in Global Environmental
Governance: Issues, Interests, and Actors in the
Mekong and the Rhine *
TUN MYINT
INTRODUCTION
This paper presents a study of the Mekong River Commission (MRC) and
the International Commission for Protection of the Rhine (ICPR). The primary
focus of this study is to analyze and explain how the issues, interests, and
participation of local communities and non-state actors, such as industries and
non-governmental organizations, are incorporated or not incorporated into
transnational environmental governance in the MRC and ICPR regimes.
Analyzing issues, interests and actors across three layers-local, national, and
transnational--of the MRC and ICPR, this paper argues that the spirit of
democracy can be enhanced in global environmental governance. Although
states remain central players in the governance of global environmental
resources, non-state actors have made striking advances both in the creation of
environmental regimes and in efforts to make these regimes function effectively
* The first version of this paper was presented at the 2001 Berlin Conference on Human Dimensions of
Global Change: Global Environmental Change and Nation States, Berlin, December 6-9, 2001.
** IDGEC Research Fellow, Institutional Dimensions of Global Environmental Change project
(Dartmouth College); Research Assistant, Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental
Change at Indiana University-Bloomington; Ph.D. Candidate, School of Public and Environmental Affairs
and Indiana University School of Law. The author benefited from the comments of various individuals in the
process of writing this paper and wishes to thank Professors Elinor Ostrom, Michael McGinnis, and
participants at the CIPEC Colloquium on November 1,2001 at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy
Analysis. He also thanks Professor Ronald Mitchell of University of Oregon for taking time to comment, as
well as Mr. Simon Mason of Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH), Zurich for his insightful
comments. During research in Rhineland, the author received kind assistance from various individuals. He
wants to acknowledge Professor Thomas Bemauer, Mr. Raphael Tschanz, and Mr. Simon Mason for their
continued support during his stay at CIS at ETH. For their time and assistance, thanks also go to Secretary
Mr. J. Harm Oterdoom and Deputy Secretary Dr. Ann Schulte-Wulwer-Leidig of ICPR (IKSR) in Koblenz,
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help from all of these individuals, the research in Rhineland would not have been possible. Finally, all errors
and incompleteness are the author's alone.
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once they are in place.' This phenomenon of increased participation of non-
state actors and local communities is evident in the governance of the Mekong
and Rhine River Basin.
The international system, in which nation-states are the key players, is
going through a period of transformation. The phenomena of democratization,
economic globalization, environmental degradation, and regional integration
2
are creating a global transformation that is shaping the future of the nation-
state, as well as the future of the international system. Describing the
challenges of global transformation, Robert 0. Keohane argues that the "key
problem of world order now is to seek to devise institutional arrangements that
are consistent both with key features of international relations and the new
shape of domestic politics.",3 In his presidential address to the 2000 American
Political Science Association Meeting, Keohane further asserted that "the
effective governance of global issues will be dependent upon interstate
cooperation and transnational networks. ' 4 Global transformation means that
the traditional international regimes that were built by the power of states and
interstate relations have become ineffective institutions, especially in regard to
global environmental issues.5 In dealing with global environmental issues,
global solutions "require local approaches when global environmental crisis
results from both the aggregation of local resource decisions and from the
impact of the global political economy on local communities.",6 This raises the
question of whether transnational environmental regimes that are designed to
foster interstate cooperation and transnational networks, such as the MRC and
ICPR, are desirable or effective forms of governance for global environmental
issues that are simultaneously linked to the local context.
1. See generally THOMAS PRINCEN & MATTHIAS FINGER, ENVIRONMENTAL NGOs IN WORLD POLITICS:
LINKING THE LOCAL AND THE GLOBAL (1994); PAUL WAPNER, ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM IN WORLD
POLITICS (1996); RONNIE D. LIPSCHUTZ & JUDITH MAYER, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: THE POLITICS OF NATURE FROM PLACE TO PLANET (1996).
2. See generally THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION
DEBATE (David Held & Andrew MeGrew eds., 2000) [hereinafter THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS
READER]; LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE: HETEROGENEITY AND COOPERATION IN TWO
DOMAINS (Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995); Stephen D. Krasner, Compromising Westphalia,
20 INT'L SECURITY 115 (1995); GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION: CHALLENGES TO THE STATE SYSTEM
(Yoshikazu Sakamoto ed., 1994) [hereinafter CHALLENGES TO THE STATE SYSTEM].
3. Robert 0. Keohane, Sovereignty in International Society, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS
READER, supra note 2, at 119.
4. Robert O. Keohane, Governance in a Partially Globalized World, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 1 (2001).
5. See THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER, supra note 2, at 105-90. See generally CHALLENGES
TO THE STATE SYSTEM, supra note 2.
6. PRINCEN & FINGER, supra note 1, at 221.
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Within these transnational regimes, there are three layers of governing
institutions: local institutions composed of individuals and industries, national
institutions in each member state composed of ministerial and municipal
governments, and transnational institutions made up of national delegations at
the transnational level and other non-state actors such as donors and non-
governmental environmental organizations. These layers are institutionally
interconnected in the governance process. Within each layer, issues, interests,
and actors shape political processes. The presence of these issues, interests,
and actors in each layer, as well as the strength of networks among them,
creates a dynamic political process. I will define this whole process as the
"governance process." Though governance by governments of states has
traditionally been the study of international affairs, governance nowadays is a
phenomenon of managing and networking issues, interests, and actors to
produce transparent actions in process and to achieve the stated goals of
regimes. This paper, in an attempt to develop a model that explains how
democracy can function in transnational environmental governance, examines
issues, interests, and actors in MRC and ICPR regimes.
Part I lays out the theoretical puzzles that form the essence of this paper.
Part II discusses the Issues, Interests, and Actors Network (IAN), employing
insights from the Institutional Analysis and Development (LAD) framework
developed at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana
University-Bloomington. Part III discusses the current states of the Mekong
and the Rhine in brief. Part IV applies the IAN framework tool to break down
and analyze governance processes mainly of the Rhine regimes. Finally, I
conclude with remarks on democracy and transnational environmental
governance in three layers of transnational regimes in the Rhine and in the
Mekong River Basins.
I. THEORETICAL PUZZLE
The subject of global environmental governance has been dominated
chiefly by the study of environmental regimes. Political scientists' work
advances the study of international regimes. Their emphasis has been on
understanding how international affairs may effectively be governed by regimes
that are designed to achieve stated goals and objectives. Political scientists'
interest is in how cooperation among sovereign states can be augmented in
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order to solve problems that are transnational in nature.7 In 1989, Peter Haas
posed the question: "do regimes matter?"8  Haas's fundamental question
prompted the study of whether regimes make any difference to the international
environmental affairs which they address. Oran R. Young answered Haas's
question: "We can state without hesitation that regimes do matter in
international society, so that there is nothing to be gained from perpetuating the
debate between neo-institutionalists and neo-realists about the 'false promise of
international institutions."9
If regimes matter, how do we measure their effectiveness? The emphasis
on the effectiveness of international regimes is heightened by the emergence of
global issues such as environmental degradation, trade disputes, disease control,
and conflict resolution. These global crises not only require international
cooperation, but also demand actions beyond traditional diplomacy. The study
of international affairs has traditionally been confined to the study of power and
diplomatic relations among sovereign states. However, regime analysts look
beyond a realist approach to the study of international affairs and further
advance a transnational perspective to global governance by drawing insights
from the experiences of international environmental regimes.'0 As Michael
Zdirn asserted in a major review of the progress of research on international
environmental politics, study of regime effectiveness has become the "driving
force" in the analysis of global environmental governance. "
The study of regime effectiveness that Zrn refers to as a "driving force" in
environmental governance focused significantly on the attainment of the stated
goals of regimes.' 2 However, the definition of regime effectiveness will not be
complete without the study of the process of governance involved in
7. See Matthijs HisschemOller & Joyeeta Gupta, Problem-Solving Through International Environmental
Agreements: The Issue of Regime Effectiveness, 20 INT'L POL. SCI. REV. 151 (1999); see also Detlef F.
Sprintz & Carsten Helm, The Effect of Global Environmental Regimes: A Measurement Concept, 20 INT'L
POL. SC. REV. 359, 361 (1999); Lisa L. Martin & Beth Simmons, Theories and Empirical Studies of
International Institutions, 52 INT'L ORG. 729, 742 (1998).
8. See generally Peter M. Haas, Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean
Pollution Control, 43 INT'L ORG. 377 (1989).
9. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIME: CAUSAL CONNECTIONS AND
BEHAVIORAL MECHANISMS 249 (Oran Young ed., 1999); see also John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise
ofInternational Institutions, 19 INT'L SECURITY 5-49 (1995).
10. See generally GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: DRAWING INSIGHTS FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL EXPERIENCE
(Oran R. Young ed., 1997).
I1. See Michael Zurm, The Rise of International Environmental Politics: A Review of Current Research,
50 WORLD POL. 617, 649 (1998).
12. See Thomas Bernauer, The Effect of International Environmental Institutions: How We Might Learn
More, 49 INT'L ORG. 351, 369 (1995).
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transnational environmental regimes. Stated goals can be achieved by an
authoritarian regime or by a supranational authority, but environmental
governance in the global context must address equity issues (or the issue of
democratic deficit) among regime actors in multiple layers. The successes or
failures of regimes are determined predominantly by how resources are used
and managed at the local layer. In search of better or more democratic
processes for transnational issues governance, Robert A. Dahl asked whether
international organizations can be democratic. 13 While Peter Haas is concerned
mainly with analyzing the outcomes of regimes (such as international
organizations) against an alternative situation in which no regimes were present
to address the relevant problem,14 Dahl questions the processes of these regimes
in producing outcomes.' 5 In other words, while Haas is concerned with the
outcomes of regime presence, Dahl addresses the democraticness of the
processes that produce outcomes. Both Haas's and Dahl's research
complement the question of how we can best shape governance processes
within layers of institutions in solving global environmental problems that are
simultaneously linked to local layers, a question that is at the heart of this paper.
In other words, this paper will address how we might enhance democracy in
the context of transnational environmental governance.
If regimes matter, we must also ask what types of regimes work best for
transnational environmental governance. Regime design has become the
current focus of debate on environmental governance across the field.
Variations among different scales and different types of regimes produce
different outcomes. At the local level, some resource appropriators (or users)
find ways to use resources in a manner that is sustainable over time and some
do not.' 6 In similar fashion, it is still unresolved why some international
regimes are successful while others are not.' 7 In essence, regime design matters
for global environmental governance. It matters not only for effectiveness in
13. Robert A. Dahl, Can International Organization Be Democratic? A Skeptic's View, in DEMOCRACY'S
EDGES 19 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordon eds., 1999).
14. Haas, supra note 8, at 401-03.
15. Dahl, supra note 13, at 32-34.
16. See Elinor Ostrom et. al, Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges, 248 SCIENCE
278, 278 (1999).
17. See THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES: CAUSAL CONNECTIONS AND
BEHAVIORAL MECHANISMS (Oran R. Young ed., 1999) [hereinafter THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES].
18. See generally Ronald B. Mitchell, Regime Design Matters: International Oil Pollution and Treaty
Compliance, 48 INT'L ORG. 425 (1994).
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producing outcomes, but also for equity and fairness in the governance process.
That is, appropriation of resources among stakeholders must be managed in a
fair process and efficient manner. It has been further argued that "effective and
humane global governance arrangements are not inevitable;"' 9 rather, regimes
must be designed. However, regime design will make sense "only to the extent
that it involves understanding of the ways institutions are likely to work in
practice."20  Therefore, the design of regimes governing transnational
environmental resources must be sensitive to and reflective of the economic,
political, and social contexts within which the regimes operate.
Environmental governance is an inherently political process. Furthermore,
it is a unique political process because the natural environment, or set of bio-
geophysical systems, is essentially a non-human actor. Young articulates the
uniqueness of environmental governance by labeling it as a "Problem of Fit,, '21
that is, of whether the institutional arrangements designed to solve
environmental problems are congruent or compatible with the bio-geophysical
systems they address. However, I would expand on this by stating that there are
two parts to the "problem of fit." The first part is whether the environmental
regimes that are designed to serve human needs (not desires) fit the economic,
social, and political contexts within which they operate. The second part is
whether the environmental regimes fit the bio-geophysical systems they
address. Therefore, the "problem of fit," as a whole, must simultaneously
address both human systems and bio-geophysical systems. This "fit" puzzle is
another reason to investigate whether the MRC and ICPR fit human systems
and the bio-geophysical systems they address.
Which part of the "problem of fit" is more important than the other is a
rather interesting question. In this paper, I would argue that the first part of the
problem of fit as a whole is more important, especially from the dimension of
governance processes, and that the second part of the problem of fit is
dependent upon the first part. If environmental regimes fit the human systems,
they are more likely to fit bio-geophysical systems. Therefore, in this paper, I
will strive for a deeper understanding of the role that issues, interests, and
actors play in the dynamic process of environmental governance in the MRC
and ICPR regimes. In so doing, I will break down and analyze governance
19. See Keohane, supra note 4, at 12.
20. See OR.AN R. YOUNG, THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: FIT,
INTERPLAY, AND SCALE 5 (2002).
21. Id. at 55.
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processes across and between local, national, and transnational layers of the
MRC and ICPR. The focal question to answer is whether local22 and non-
state23 actors are crucial to the success24 of environmental governance in the
MRC and ICPR.
Methodologically, to explain the environmental governance of transnational
environmental resources, it is important to understand the institutional linkages
among various layers of transnational environmental regimes. Within the lens
of institutionalist theory, transnational regimes can be conceptually separated
into three layers-local, national, and transnational layers. In order to analyze
and explain how issues, interests, and actors interplay and what linkages
between these layers are in the governance process, I will apply the framework
of "scaling down" and "scaling up," i.e. a combination of both top-down and
bottom-up approaches. 25 There are both formal and informal institutional
linkages between the three layers of the MRC and ICPR. Through these
linkages, the issues, interests, and actors in each layer are interconnected and
emerge as institutional drivers to operate the regimes' governance processes.
II. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ISSUES, INTERESTS, AND ACTORS
A. Interplay of Issues, Interests, and Actors
Two sources of literature serve as a starting point to theorizing about the
interplay of issues, interests, and actors in the environmental governance
processes of the MRC and ICPR regimes. The first source is the works of
Arthur F. Bentley, who pioneered the study of "group interest" to explain the
political influence of pressure groups on the three branches of the U.S.
government. In his work The Process of Government, published in 1908,
Bentley asserts, "[t]here is no group without its interest[s] .... The group and
the interest are not separate .... If we try to take the group [for analysis]
22. 1 define the term "local actor" as a local stakeholder whose decision-making capacity is directly
affected by policy and laws of national government and transnational institutions.
23. I define a "non-state actor" as a stakeholder whose interests cross multiple legal jurisdictions and
political boundaries, and whose decision-making capacity is directly affected by the policy and laws of MRC
and ICPR.
24. 1 define "success" or "effectiveness" of a regime to mean both fair process of governance and
achievement of the regime's stated goals. Fair process requires all actors to play their respective important
roles in the governance process.
25. See generally Oran R. Young, The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes, in
GOVERNANCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS 108 (1999).
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without the interest, we have simply nothing at all."'26  In studying the
governance processes of the MRC and ICPR, the fundamental elements of
analysis are institutions and formally and informally established groups. The
interests of MRC and ICPR institutions cannot be ignored by scholars, for
analytical purposes, or by practitioners, for practical purposes. Bentley argues
that special interests are the "raw materials of politics. '27 I further assert that
they are the raw materials of effective and fair governance processes. Bentley
believes that political campaigns of local activists and lobbyists, their acts of
pressure, persuasion, conflict, and collusion, are not to be denounced or
deplored, but rather described and understood.2 8 Furthermore, interests are the
driving force not only for lobbyist groups, but also for governments. In a
democratic governance system, the interests of politicians and electoral
representatives collectively become the engine of governance. Therefore, the
study of governance processes must analyze the dynamic interplay of interests
in relation to issues and actors.
The second source of literature is the works of Harold D. Lasswell and
Myres McDougal on "law, science, and policy. 29 In a series of unpublished
lecture notes that were compiled and documented at Indiana University School
of Law in 1954, Lasswell explains what he calls "social process" as a
mechanism by which "persons influence one another to pursue values." He
writes:
When two persons influence one another, we speak of the
process as social . . . . In a world shrinking at an ever
accelerating rate because of relentlessly expanding, uniformly-
imposing technology, the people of the globe as a whole
constitute a world community, which in turn is composed of a
myriad of smaller communities .... Acting as individuals and
in concert, the participants in all social processes, large and
small, pursue values through institutions using resources.
30
26. ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF SOCIAL PRESSURES 211, 213
(1908).
27. Id. at 176.
28. See id. at 175-99.
29. HAROLD DWIGHT LASSWELL & MYRES MCDOUGAL, LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY (1954) (unpublished
lecture notes on file with the Indiana University School of Law Library).
30. Id., pt. I1, ch. I, para. 1.
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Social process, Lasswell explains, is the mechanism by which individual
actors pursue values in society. In essence, Lasswell's assertion conveys that
actors are guided mainly by the values they uphold in society. However, actors'
choices are always constrained by either issues or interests. Issues are socially
and politically crafted. For instance, as will be discussed later in this paper, the
issue of Rhine pollution was not on the political agenda of riparian countries
until the Dutch government initiated establishment of the transnational regime
in 1950.31 Investigative journalism and specific issue-oriented non-
governmental environmental organizations such as the World Wildlife Fund
(WWF) or Greenpeace often raise environmental issues to the policy agenda
across institutional layers.
B. Issues, Interests, and Actors Network (IAN)
Interests are mainly economically driven, issues are socially and politically
crafted, and actors are value-oriented in the interplay of Issues, Interests, and
Actors Network model (IAN). When there is a strong presence of these issues,
interests, and actors with respect to a particular environmental problem in each
layer of a transnational regime, effective cooperation among actors for
environmental governance will more likely be achieved. In a world of highly
interdependent heterogeneous forces that shape the process of governance, the
governance process must be fair. The fairness of the governance process is a
crucial parameter for the fitness of regimes to the social, political, and
economic contexts within which the regimes operate.
"Network," in IAN, refers to a complicated intermingling of lines, linkages,
passages, roads, individuals, and layers of institutions that makes it possible for
regimes to achieve certain objectives that require various independent elements
(issues, interests, and actors) to work together. If various issues, interests, and
actors are to function effectively, there must be institutional arrangements that
enable them to work in unison. This union can be established when actors are
willing and able to work with interests and issues transparently. Constructive
cooperation of various actors is possible only with a free flow of information,
allowing linkages between IANs to develop and design a transnational
governance mechanism.
Based on preliminary findings from my research on the MIRC and ICPR,
environmental governance processes can be explained by analyzing Issues,
31. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
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Interests, and Actors Networks within each layer of transnational environmental
regimes. In the form of a network, issues, interests, and actors interdependently
shape one another to become the engine of a governance process, as shown in
Figure I below.
By analyzing regime governance with the IAN model, we find that issues
finally become agenda, interests become essentially organized interests, and
actors become stakeholders (Figure I). The important assumption in the
process is that although issues, interests, and actors are interdependent, they do
not have absolute control over one another.
Figure I: Process of Issues, Interests, and Actors Network
For instance, the issue of water quality of the Rhine was not a primary
political and social concern in the context of pre-1950 Rhine regimes. Rather,
the issues of navigation and fishing quotas were perceived as problems for
many countries at that time. The dominant existence of the international Rhine
treaty on Navigation, signed in 1868,32 and the 1885 Salmon Treaty 33 illustrate
32. Convention Revisee Pour la Navigation du Rhin (Mannheim Convention], Oct. 17, 1868, in 1 U.N.
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION, SYSTEMATIC INDEX OF INTERNATIONAL WATER RESOURCES
TREATIES, DECLARATIONS, ACTS AND CASES BY BASIN, LEGISLATIVE STUDY NO. 15, at 89 (1978).
33. Staatsvertrag uber die Lachsfischerei im Rhein [International Treaty on Salmon Fishing in the Rhine],
June 7, 1886; see Alexandre Charles Kiss, La Pollution du Rhin et le Droit International Public, in LA
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that the water quality of the Rhine was not a significant issue for the Rhine
Regime. Finally, in the 1950s, the government of the Netherlands put the water
quality issue on the agenda for international affairs and initiated the
establishment of the ICPR in 1950. Even though the issue of water quality of
the Rhine, a priori, had existed since industrialization began along the bank of
the river, no political institutions raised this issue as one to be solved by means
of international cooperation until the Dutch government politicized it. Due to
increasing costs in the purification process for water supplies companies in the
Netherlands, the Dutch government was positioned to include water pollution
issues on the international political agenda among the Rhine riparian countries.
As the lowest country downstream, the Netherlands had a legitimate interest to
raise at the international level.
In the Mekong river basin area, environmental issues such as water
pollution and ecosystem destruction are still in the stage of infancy. That is,
these issues have yet to become policy agenda in local and national layers.
Poverty reduction and trust-building among the riparian countries are at the
active stage of interplay at the local layer. Compared to the Rhine regime, the
Mekong regime is at the preventive stage with the issue of water pollution. The
Rhine regime, on the other hand, is at the rehabilitation stage. As we shall see
in the following sections, governance processes of the MRC and ICPR
essentially are shaped by the presence and interplay of IANs in each layer of a
regime.
III. THE MEKONG RIVER COMMISSION AND THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE RHINE
A. The Mekong River Commission
The Mekong is the world's twelfth longest river. Originating from its
headwaters on the Tibetan Plateau, it runs 4,193 kilometers south through the
Yunnan Province of China, Myanmar (Burma), Laos P.D.R., Thailand,
Cambodia, and Vietnam. More than fifty million people depend upon the
Mekong River and its tributaries for food, water, transportation, and many other
aspects of their daily lives. The river's annual flood-drought cycles are
POLLUTION DU RHIN: ASPECTS JURIDIQUES, ECONOMIQUES ET TECHNIQUES [RHINE POLLUTION: LEGAL,
ECONOMIC, AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS] 59-80 (R. Hueting ed., 1978).
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essential for the sustainable production of food crops on the floodplains and
along the banks of the rivers during the dry season.34
The Mekong river basin is the second richest in biodiversity among the
world's river basin areas. It has been a life support system for human survival
in the region. The 1999 MRC annual report states that "some 45-50 million
people are employed in the agriculture sector. Rice is the most important crop,
but fisheries follow rice cultivation almost invariably. [T]ogether with rice, fish
forms the basis of the food security for the people in the Lower Mekong
Basin., 35 Therefore, the sustainable utilization of water and natural resources
in the Mekong region is the main concern for riparian countries.
B. Institutional Evolution of the MRC
The MRC has evolved through three stages of institution building. The
first stage began with the establishment of a transnational governing body
known as the Mekong Committee in 1957, initiated by the United Nations. The
original Committee members were Cambodia, Laos P.D.R., South Vietnam,
and Thailand. The Mekong Committee originated within the Bureau of Flood
Control of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and Far East
(ECAFE), now known as the United Nations Economic and Social Commission
for Asia and Pacific (ESCAP). The Mekong Committee was the first
transnational governing body in the region, and thus it is a pioneer in regional
cooperation in Southeast Asia.
The second stage of evolution came at the end of the second Indo-China
war, with the triumph of North Vietnam over South Vietnam. Communist
victories in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in 1975 almost ended the Mekong
Committee, as the three Communist states refused to participate in the functions
of the Committee. Meanwhile, Vietnam invaded Cambodia and ousted the
Khmer Rouge by installing a pro-Vietnamese government in Cambodia.
However, with the diplomatic negotiations initiated by the United Nations, the
Mekong Committee was transformed into the Interim Mekong Committee
(IMC), composed of Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand, in 1978. The 1978 IMC
Statute called for the reactivation of the Mekong Committee when Cambodia
34. Nmns Bandara Nawarathna et al., Influence of Human Activities on the BTOPMC Model Runoff
Simulations in Large-Scale Watersheds, in XXIX IAHR Congress Proceedings, Theme A (Sept. 16-21,2001),
available at http://www.iahr.org/e-library/beijing-proceedings/HTMlihomepage.html.
35. Mekong River Commission, Annual Report 1999, at 21, at http://www.mrcmekong.org/pdf/annrep.pdf
[hereinafter MRC Annual Report].
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rejoined. 36 Cambodia rejoined and a reactivated Mekong Committee replaced
the IMC with the signing of the Declaration of November 4, 1991 in Bangkok.
The third stage of institutional evolution emerged when the Cold War was
winding down in Southeast Asia. This geopolitical transformation opened up
new prospects for cooperation in the Mekong region. As the rivals in the
Cambodian civil war signed a peace agreement in Paris in 1991, Cambodia
prepared to reenter the Mekong regime. Once again, negotiations initiated by
the United Nations took place in various stages to reconstruct the Mekong
regime. This series of negotiations led to a political agreement in which the
lower Mekong riparian countries--Cambodia, Laos P.D.R., Thailand, and
Vietnam-agreed to establish the MRC on April 5, 1995 in Thailand. With
this final stage of institutional establishment, the MRC replaced the Mekong
Committee established in 1957 and the IMC established in 1978. China and
Myanmar did not seek to join the MRC, as these two countries did not see the
benefits of joining the regime.
C. MRC Institutional Design
The MRC is structured with three permanent bodies-the Council, the
37Joint Committee, and the Secretariat. The Council is composed of one
member from each MRC member country at the Ministerial and the Cabinet
levels.38 The Council convenes annually and produces policy guidelines,
represents national initiatives, resolves conflicts, and makes policy decisions.39
The Council's decisions are made by unanimous consensus. The Secretariat's
office provides necessary technical assistance in this process. The Secretariat
also facilitates the participation of non-governmental organizations, donors, and
those with local concerns in the policy process of the Council and in the
implementation process at the national level. In each member state, there is a
National Mekong Committee (NMC) responsible for carrying out functions of
36. See generally Communique Conceming the Mekong Committee, in Declaration Concerning the Interim
Mekong Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin, Jan. 5, 1978, Laos-
Thailand-Vietnam (available in Greg Browder, Negotiating an International Regime for Water Allocation in
the Mekong River Basin (1998) (Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University)).
37. Agreement on Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin, Apr. 5, 1995,
art. 12, at http://www.mrcmekong.org/pdf/agree95.pdf [hereinafter Agreement on Cooperation].
38. Id., art. 15. See also MRC Annual Report, supra note 35, at 2, 4-6.
39. Agreement on Cooperation, supra note 37, at art. 18. See also MRC Annual Report, supra note 35, at
2, 4-6.
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national policy and programs agreed to at the MRC transnational level. NMCs
thus oversee implementation of programs at the local level.
D. MRC Programs
The IRC's objective is "to co-operate in all fields of sustainable
development, utilisation, management and conservation of the water and related
resources of the Mekong River Basin.'40 In order to achieve this objective and
to implement the Mekong Agreement, the MRC has launched three core
programs that call for the active participation of national and local
communities. First, in accordance with Articles 5 and 6 of the Mekong
Agreement, which mandate water utilization and ecological protection, the
MRC inaugurated the Water Utilisation Programme (WUP) in 1999.41 The
1999 MRC Annual Report alleges that the WUP will be "a major test-case for
the potential for regional co-operation on the development and use of the
Mekong river basin resources. Its implementation will also be a major test-case
on the effectiveness and relevance of the Mekong River Commission itself.-42
Second, along with the WUP, the MRC began to launch Basin
Development Planning (BDP) in 2000 with the target of completion in 2003. 43
BDP is "envisaged as both a general planning tool and a process which will be
used by the joint Committee as a blue-print for identifying and prioritizing
programs and projects at basin-wide level" in order to realize sustainable
development of the Mekong region." The MRC's Secretariat is responsible for
assisting the Joint Committee with technical and administrative works to
accomplish BDP.
The third major program that is being implemented is the MRC
Environment Training Programme (MRC-EP). 45 The MRC-EP will provide
scientific data and technical advice to the MRC for carrying out programs and
projects in sustainable ways. The MRC-EP therefore is the key program in
addressing the environmental impacts of other MRC programs such as dam
projects, irrigation, and water utilization programs. In addition to the three core
programs, there are five area programs. These are the Fisheries Program, the
40. Mekong River Commission, About MRC, at http://www.mrcmekong.org/aboutmrc/aboutOOl.htm
(last visited Nov. 13, 2002).
41. MRC Annual Report, supra note 35, at 19.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 19-20.
44. Id. at 19.
45. See id. at 23-25.
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Agriculture, Irrigation, and Forestry Program, the Water Resources and
Hydrology Program, the Navigation Program, and the Tourism Program."
E. The International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine
The Rhine River originates in the Swiss Alps, where two tributaries (the
Hinterrhine and the Vorderrhine) flow down and collide at the village of
Reichenau-Tamin. From that point on, the Rhine weaves through valleys to
reach Lake Constance. This part of the Rhine is called the Alpine Rhine. After
leaving Lake Constance, the river flows down to the chemical industrial city
called Basel (or Basle in French). This part of the Rhine is known as the High
Rhine. Along the Alpine and High Rhine, until it forms Europe's largest falls,
called the Rhinefalls, at the village of Neuhausen, the river is wild, active, and
dynamic in its course of flow.
The Rhine is Western Europe's largest river, at 1,326 kilometers in
length.47 At its origin in the glaciers of the Swiss Alps, it constitutes the border
between Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and Austria until it reaches Lake
Constance (Bodensee). It then continues to form the border between Germany
and France, after leaving Basel to flow through a large part of western
Germany, and finally crosses into the Netherlands and pours into the North
Sea.4' The Rhine's catchment area covers 22,400 square-kilometers and
encompasses parts of Italy, Luxembourg, and Belgium. The catchment area
provides a habitat for about sixty million people in addition to other living
organisms.49
Humans and other inhabitants use the Rhine in a variety of ways. The
Rhine was historically important for water transportation, and is still widely
used as a shipping route, with the world's largest seaport, located in Rotterdam,
at its mouth.5 0 The problem of water quality was one of the first issues that
prompted the riparian countries to consider cooperation, due to industrial
buildup on the bank of the river. Although the problems with the quality of
water in the Rhine were already recognized in the fifteenth century, "it was not
until the 20th Century that the advanced stage of water pollution in the river
46. See generally id.
47. Carel H.V. de Villeneueve, Western Europe's Artery: The Rhine, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 441 (1996).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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became clearly apparent.' '51 Europe's industrialization process had a great
impact on the Rhine ecosystem. By the early 1960s, the pollution of the Rhine
by organic substances had lowered the level of dissolved oxygen well below
normal levels, and as a consequence, almost all aquatic life had disappeared
from the river. "Large amounts of heavy metal compounds, pesticides,
hydrocarbons, and organic chlorine compounds were being discharged into the
river. '5 2 This obviously caused further ecological problems, notably the
disappearance of native fish species and the continued deterioration of the
water quality. "By the end of the 1960s, the Rhine had the unflattering
reputation of being the sewer of Europe.,
5 3
F. Emergence of International Cooperation
The deterioration of the Rhine's water quality and degradation of natural
resources were the obvious reasons that the Rhine's future required effective
international cooperation. From the perspective of the historical evolution of
the relationship between the ecosystems of the Rhine and its human inhabitants,
the end of World War II marked the beginning of a new chapter in the Rhine's
history. In 1950, with an initiative from the Netherlands, the riparian countries
of the Rhine located downstream from Lake Constance-Switzerland, France,
Germany, Luxembourg (through the tributary river Moselle), and the
Netherlands-joined forces by establishing, on a rather informal basis, the
ICPR.
5 4
During the ICPR's first decade, it served as a common forum for discussion
of pollution in the Rhine. In 1963, however, the ICPR parties concluded that
the existing tools for cooperation among governments should be strengthened,
and formalized the Commission's existence through an agreement at Berne,
adding a permanent joint secretariat at Koblenz, Germany. In the ICPR
agreement signed at Berne, "the ICPR was entrusted with the following tasks:
" studying the nature, volume, and origins of the Rhine pollution;
" proposing appropriate measures to control pollution to the governments of
contracting parties;
51. See Koos Wieriks & Anne Schulte-WUlwer-Leidig, Integrated Water Management for the Rhine River
Basin: From Pollution Prevention to Ecosystem Improvement, 21 NAT. RESOURCES F. 147, 148 (1997).
52. Id. at 149.
53. Id.
54. de Villeneueve, supra note 47, at 443.
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- preparing further agreements between the governments of contracting
parties;
- undertaking any other task jointly entrusted to it by the governments of
contracting parties; and
- drawing up a yearly report on its activities.""
s
In 1976, the ICPR agreement was amended to enable the European
Economic Community (EC, the predecessor of the EU) to join. The EC's
accession to ICPR had become inevitable in view of its newly developing
environmental regulations, particularly in the field of water pollution within EC
jurisdiction.56 As a consequence of the EC's environmental regulation regime,
its member states could no longer conclude agreements with non-EC states such
as Switzerland. Therefore, the EC's participation in the ICPR was important
for the ICPR's future as well as for the uniformity of EC environmental
regulation. The EC commission, since then, has fully participated in the ICPR
and has shared its costs. In matters falling under EC competence, it exerts its
voting right on behalf of EC member states in the ICPR (which includes all
ICPR states except Switzerland). However, it is interesting to note that the EC
does not function as a member state within the ICPR in matters of
implementation and administration of ICPR agreements, since these functions
are left to the member states.
G. ICPR Regime Outlook
With the five member countries plus the European Union, the ICPR regime
has transformed from a treaty-type regime to an action-oriented regime. There
are three major mechanisms of lCPR environmental governance. The first two
are legally binding treaties-the 1976 Convention for the Protection of the
Rhine Against Chemical Pollution (Chemical Convention)57 and the 1976
Convention for the Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution by Chloride
(Chloride Convention).58 The third and most famous mechanism is the Rhine
Action Programme inaugurated in 1987 and concluded in 2000,59 which was a
55. Id. at 444; see also Agreement on the Int'l Comm'n for the Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution,
Apr. 29, 1963, 993 U.N.T.S. 18, at art. 2.
56. de Villeneueve, supra note 47, at 445.
57. Convention on the Protection of the Rhine against Chemical Pollution, Dec. 3 1976, 16 l.L.M. 242
(1977), available at http://www.fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/texts/BH697.txt [hereinafter Chemical Convention].
58. Convention for the Protection of the Rhine River Against Pollution by Chlorides, Dec. 3, 1976, 16
I.L.M. 265 (1977) [hereinafter Chloride Convention].
59. See de Villeneuve, supra note 47, at 452.
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non-binding action oriented program. These three regime designs for ICPR
environmental governance are the central focus of my analysis using the IAN
model.
IV. IAN ANALYSIS OF THE ICPR
A. Issues, Interests, and Actors in the 1976 Chemical Convention
The aim of the Chemical Convention was to reduce pollution of the Rhine
by gradually eliminating discharges of hazardous chemical elements including
heavy metals from chemical industries, community sewage systems, and
agricultural land.60 The first step in achieving these goals was the formation of
black and gray lists for regulation. The black list was to include most toxic
chemical substances, and the reduction of discharges of these substances was to
become a priority.61 The gray list was to include chemical substances that were
less toxic but that still needed regulation.62 However, the implementation has
met with difficulties.
At the transnational level, during the first three decades of the ICPR
regime, the key issue has been building trust among national delegations.
According to Peter Huisman, a former Secretary actively involved in the ICPR
from 1971 to 1985, trust building among the member states took an enormous
amount of time and effort. 63 Another important reason why the Chemical
Convention was not as successful as hoped was because of the lack of political
will at the national level. Environmental issues at the time were not so
important to national economies, while industrialization was at its peak for
building stronger economies in member countries. According to Huisman,
getting all of the countries to come together at the meeting to discuss Rhine
pollution was itself a significant step at the beginning. 4 However, it was
accomplished not entirely due to national political will, but also because local
'pressure groups" raised issues of Rhine pollution publicly.
Another issue at the negotiation meetings was whether the industries were
capable, in terms of resources and technology, of implementing pollution
60. See id. at 449.
61. See id. (outlining measures related to "list I").
62. See id. (outlining measures related to "list II").
63. Interview with Pieter Huisman, River Basin Administration, University of Delft, Netherlands (July 5,
2001) [hereinafter Huisman Interview].
64. Id.
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reduction standards-especially effluent limits-set by the Chemical
Convention. The effluent limits set the maximum allowable limit on pollutant
chemicals in discharged wastewater from industries. This is different from the
general water quality standard. If industries discharged wastewater into the
Rhine containing pollutant chemicals that exceeded the effluent limit, the
effluent fee was assessed. For many industries, paying the effluent fee was not
a major issue;65 the major issue was rather the capacity to reduce the content of
pollutant chemicals entirely. For the ICPR, under pressure from the
Netherlands, the solution is not about assessing effluent fees, but about cleaning
the Rhine River by reducing the discharge of eighty-three blacklisted
chemicals.66
Meanwhile, the German delegation suggested implementation of the EU-
wide effluent limit.67 German industries supported this suggestion, because if
the effluent limit applied to only the Rhine basin industries, they would be at a
disadvantage compared with other EU chemical industries, such as British
68chemical industries, in the common market outside of Rhine basin areas.
Therefore, the EU regional approach was discussed. This analysis also helps to
explain why the European Community joined ICPR as a full-fledged member in
1976. Because the EU became a member of the ICPR, it was feasible for it to
discuss a regional approach to effluent limits as suggested by the German
delegation.
65. See MARCO VERWEIJ, TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS AND CULTURAL THEORY: THE
PROTECTION OF THE RHINE AND THE GREAT LAKES 116 (2000).
66. Id. at 116-18.
67. Huisman, supra note 63.
68. See Carel Dieperink, Between Salt and Salmon: Network Management in the Rhine Catchment Area,
in MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: NETWORK MANAGEMENT AS AN ALTERNATIVE 119, 128-29
(Peter Glasbergen ed., 1995); VERWEIJ, supra note 65, at 83.
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 10:287
Table I: Issues, Interests, and Actors Network in the Chemical Convention
Institutional Issues Interests Actors
Layers
Transnational *Chemical *Downstream oICPR
pollution of the pressure *Germany and
Rhine (83 in *Cost of effluent Switzerland
black list) limit *The Netherlands
eBuilding *Regional *National
international approach for cost Delegations
cooperation sharing
,industrial
compliance
National *Lack of political eCost of regulation *Ministerial
will ePressure from eMunicipal
•Lack of trust in chemical ,Industries
other member industries
states ePressure from
*Perceived as water supply
international companies (the
problem Netherlands)
Local eDrinking water eCost of *Chemical
supply compliance industries
*Public health *Cost of drinking eWater supply
*Sewer image water industries
*Health risk *Communities of
*Recreation interests
*Local NGOs
The Chemical Convention, however, was finally stalled, due to the conflict
that arose in 1979 between the Netherlands and France regarding chloride
pollution when the Netherlands called back its ambassador from Paris for
consultation. However, the major reason for the failure of the Chemical
Convention is that all the relevant issues and actors were not involved in the
entire process of negotiation and implementation. Neither NGOs nor the
industries were invited, nor were they regarded as important actors in the
process at the national and transnational layers. The ICPR regime was
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functioning based on a state-centered approach, as if states were the most
important players in transnational environmental governance. Additionally, the
binding nature of the regime design was an indicator that member countries did
not trust each other, fearing a serious free-rider problem. A lesson from the
Chemical Convention is that environmental governance cannot be successful
without taking into account all relevant issues, interests, and actors across the
three layers of the regime.
B. Issues, Interests, and Actors in the 1976 Chloride Convention
The main agenda of the Chloride Convention focused on the Alsatian mine
company, Potasse de'Alsace, in France, which was responsible for thirty-five to
forty percent of the total discharge of 400 kilograms of chloride (salt) per
second (kg/s) into the Rhine.69 The chloride discharges were especially harmful
to the interests of several Dutch water companies, flower growers, and the port
of Rotterdam. According to the negotiated treaty, the discharges of the mine
company were to be cut by 60 kg/s in three phases. 70 In this process, the salts
that were not discharged into the Rhine were to be injected into the Alsatian
earth. The estimated cost was 132 million French francs. 71 The agreement
provided that the Netherlands would finance thirty-four percent of the project,
Germany and France would each pay thirty percent of the costs, and
Switzerland would pay the remaining six percent.72 For a number of years, the
French government was reluctant to consider Alsatian salt and the Rhine issue
on its agenda of parliament ratification, as it was occupied with two other
issues. The first was rising unemployment in France, and the second was the
labor strike in the Alsatian mines.73 Additionally, some in France worried that
the proposed solution would cause groundwater pollution.74 As a result, France
delayed its compliance with the agreement. This caused direct conflict with the
Netherlands, which was facing heavy pressure from local water supply
industries and the port of Rotterdam. The Dutch government recalled its
ambassador from Paris for consultation, and the relationship between France
69. de Villeneuve, supra note 47, at 446.
70. Id.
71. See VERWEIJ, supra note 65, at 84.
72. Id.
73. Huisman Interview, supra note 63.
74. de Villeneuve, supra note 47, at 447.
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and the Netherlands deteriorated as a result of the fallout over the Chloride
Convention.75
The Chloride Convention is the least favorite topic of discussion for ICPR
leaders. When asked about the Chloride Convention, the current deputy
Secretariat of the ICPR described it as "the worst experience" of the ICPR
regime, because it caused many other obstacles not closely related to the
76
chloride case. As a result of the chloride controversy, the whole ICPR regime
was stalled; no other issues were discussed due to the intense conflict on the
issue. The key problem, once again, was the lack of political will within
member states, especially in France. In addition, low levels of trust and
cooperation among the member states also caused difficulties.
Table II: Issues, Interests, and Actors in the Chloride Convention
Institutional Issues Interests Actors
Layers
Transnational oConflict between 'Cost of *ICPR
the Netherlands operation 'France
and France oDownstream 'The Netherlands
'International pressure 'National
cooperation oDefining Delegations
oICPR's role responsible party
challenged to pay for cleanup
National 'Lack of political *Damage to farm oDiplomats
will land 'Ministries
*Unemployment *Pressure from 'Municipals
and labor strike in water industries 'Water supply
France 'Pressure from and mining
'International Alsatian mine industries
problem workers
'Faith of ICPR
I__ I_ regime 1
75. Id.
76. Interview with Anne Schulte-Wilwer-Leidig, Koblenz, Germany (July 25, 2001) [hereinafter Schulte-
Wulwer-Leidig Interview].
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Local *Drinking water oCost of water *Local farmers
supply purification *Alsatian mining
*Public health eLoss of industry in
*Agriculture agricultural land France
from salinization *Water supply
in the industries in the
Netherlands Netherlands
eNGOs
C. Issues, Interests, and Actors in the Rhine Action Program
The ICPR's further development as an effective transnational regime was
perhaps sparked by the Sandoz chemical accident. 7 Pieter Huisman called the
Sandoz spill a "gift from heaven" in that it raised awareness of the seriousness
of the need for rehabilitation of the Rhine. On November 1, 1986, a fire
broke out at a storage building for dangerous chemicals at a Swiss
pharmaceutical company near Basel, Switzerland.79 The firefighters arrived in
time to extinguish the fire. However, the water used to extinguish the fire
mixed with the dangerous chemicals, and eventually reached the adjacent
stretch of the Rhine. As a consequence, a several hundred-mile stretch of the
Rhine became ecologically dead.80 This disaster received large press coverage,
and the ICPR parties reacted swiftly. On November 12, 1986, the ministers
held joint meetings and assessed the remedial process. At the same time,
Sandoz's chief executives joined the ministerial meeting and explained what
went wrong. As the incident triggered a wave of publicity in all the countries
bordering the Rhine, political attention was alerted, and within a very short time
several ministerial conferences were addressing the issue of Rhine pollution.
With environmental issues already high on the political agenda in many
countries in the mid-1980s, the 1986 Sandoz accident spurred the ICPR to
implement the Rhine Action Programme for Ecological Rehabilitation (RAP) in
1987.81
77. See Alyssa Glass & Carrie Snyder, Shocked into Action: Combating Pollution in the Rhine, 18 HARV.
INT'L REV. 48 (1996); de Villeneuve, supra note 47, at 451.
78. Huisman Interview, supra note 63.
79. Glass & Snyder, supra note 77, at 48.
80. Id.
81. de Villeneuve, supra note 47, at 45 1.
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The combination of political opportunity, the Sandoz accident, the
existence of an institutional framework, and the extensive and responsive
preparatory work carried out by the ICPR laid the foundation for the emergence
of the RAP. The RAP had the following four goals, to be attained by the year
2000: the Rhine ecosystem should be improved to such an extent that higher
species, such as salmon and sea trout, return to the Rhine; the production of
drinking water from the Rhine must be guaranteed for the future; the pollution
of river sediments must be reduced to such an extent that at any time sludge
may be used for land fill or may be dumped at sea; and the improvement of the
ecology of the North Sea must be a requirement of the North Sea Program.
82
The RAP's first goal, enabling the return of species such as salmon, is
perhaps the most ambitious of its four goals, since salmon are migratory fish
and require different river habitats for spawning, nursery, and migration. The
return of salmon is further complicated by the fact that they require
unobstructed passage in the river for upstream migration, a condition that has
been eliminated due to the weirs, locks, and dams regulating the river. Salmon
are also dependent on other river species that require varied habitats and are
sensitive to pollution for food. Therefore, reintroduction of the salmon requires
high water quality and restored hydrological and morphological conditions.83
Since the return of salmon requires the restoration of a complex set of
conditions, the ICPR has elaborated on its first goal in the Ecological Master
Plan for the Rhine.84
By 2000, the success of both the RAP and pollution control programs were
reported. The UNESCO Courier report in June, 2000 called it the "Miracle of
the Rhine," reporting the findings of scientists that salmon and other species of
fish had returned to the Rhine's waters.8 5 The environmental media watching
the ICPR's programs described the RAP as a "model for future."8 6  The
82. Id. at 451-52. The North Sea Program aims to reduce pollution and nutrient loading in the North Sea.
See generally G.M. Van Dijk et al., Ecological Rehabilitation of the River Rhine: Plans, Progress and
Perspectives, 11 REGULATED RIVERS: RES. & MGMT. 377-88 (1995).
83. Salmon are particularly sensitive to the quality of water in their habitat. Therefore, the RAP's goal of
enabling the return of salmon means improving water quality to levels in which other species can also survive.
Van Dijk, supra note 82, at 377; Schulte-Wulwer-Leidig Interview, supra note 76; Huisman Interview, supra
note 63; see also International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine, Salmon 2000, at http://
www.iksr.org/icpr/1 Ouk.htm.
84. de Villeneuve, supra note 47, at 453.
85. See Urs Weber, The "Miracle" of the Rhine, THE UNESCO COURIER, June 2000, at 9.
86. See Glass and Snyder, supra note 77, at 75.
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European Union issued a water directive in July 2000 that was modeled after
the success of the transnational cooperation among the Rhine countries.
Table III:
Program
Issues, Interests, and Actors Network in the Rhine Action
Institutional Issues Interests Actors
Layers
Transnational -Transparency of sEcological loss oICPR
all Rhine issues *Revitalization of oEU
oNGOs the Rhine oNational
participation and ecosystems Delegations
public education *Maintaining and eNGOs
*Monitor member increasing *Industries
states' coordination
implementation among actors
*Maintain mutual
trust
National *Building fish *Reduce long-term *Ministerial
passages by cost level
removing weirs oMaintaining eMunicipal
and locks national integrity governments
eEnforcing and value eIndustries
domestic *National NGOs
regulations
Local *Demand for *Ecological health oOrganized
recreational of the Rhine water supply
activities -Environmental industries
*Demand for awareness and (LAWR 87)
drinking water value of the Rhine eOrganized
chemical
industries
87. Internationale Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Wasserwerke im Rheineinzugsgebier [International Association
of Waterworks in the Rhine].
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D. Issues, Interests, and Actors in Rhine Governance
The illustrated experiences of transnational environmental governance in
the Rhine support the conclusion that a partial answer, if not the entire answer,
to the question of why two previous legally binding regimes-the 1976
Chemical and Chloride Conventions-failed in achieving their stated goals was
the lack of interconnectedness and institutional linkages among issues, interests,
and actors across three layers. The RAP, although there is still room for
improvement, transformed the Rhine regime into a mechanism of governance
that opened the door to participation by various relevant actors (Table IV). In
so doing, the RAP enhanced the spirit of democracy, which was crucial to the
success of the Rhine rehabilitation regime. The RAP fits better into the
political, social, and economic contexts within which it operated than did the
Chemical and Chloride Conventions. The previous two regimes did not fit the
structure of the problems of the Rhine regime because they ignored important
issues, interests, and actors, especially from local layers, as we have observed in
IAN analysis. As a result, the previous two regimes failed to achieve their
stated goals of cleaning up the Rhine.
Table IV: Comparison of Actors in Two Types of Rhine Regime
Institutional Actors in 1976 Actors in 1976 Actors in Rhine
Layers Chemical Chloride Action Program
Convention Convention
Transnational .ICPR eICPR 9ICPR
*Germany and *France eEU
Switzerland *The Netherlands eNational
*The Netherlands *National Delegations
eNational Delegations eNGOs
Delegations eIndustries
National eMinistries *Diplomats *Ministries
eMunicipal *Ministries eMunicipal
,Industries ,Municipals governments
eWater supply and *Industries
mining industries *National NGOs
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Local 'Chemical eLocal farmers @Organized
industries *Alsatian mining water supply
'Water supply industry in France industries
industries 'Water supply (IAWR)
'Communities of industries in the *Organized
interests Netherlands chemical
* Local NGOs eNGOs industries
The empirical evidence that emerged from the experience of the Rhine not
only demonstrates the importance of enhancing the spirit of democracy; it also
offers some insights about the crucial relationship between democracy across
multiple layers of transnational environmental regimes and the sustainability
that such regimes address. The institutional arrangements that are designed to
address environmental problems need to fit human systems; that is, they have to
enhance democracy among actors. At the same time, they must achieve their
goals in ways that fit the bio-geophysical system. According to the empirical
evidence discussed above, in the context of governance of the Rhine, the
institutional arrangement that fits the human system, the RAP, tends also to fit
the bio-geophysical system. On the other hand, the institutional arrangements
that do not fit the human system, the Chemical and Chloride Convention
regimes, failed to fit the bio-geophysical system. These results suggest that
transnational environmental governance must address democracy and
sustainability simultaneously.
CONCLUSION
The experience of the ICPR in governing transnational environmental
resources provides rich lessons for how we might enhance the democracy of
transnational environmental governance while achieving sustainability. The
spirit of democracy can be enhanced by promoting and providing political and
legal contexts in which all relevant issues, interests, and actors in all layers can
participate in decisionmaking and implementation processes. I would argue
that the dynamic presence of IANs in each layer of transnational environmental
governance is crucial to the success of a regime in carrying out its goals and
achieving sustainability. At the same time, the spirit of democracy could be
enhanced further by thinning the borders that exist between layers. As
practitioners, managing the linkages among IANs across all layers will be an
important task in achieving the goals of transnational environmental
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governance. Researchers, by ignoring the IANs in analysis of transnational
environmental governance regimes such as the MRC and ICPR, will lack
empirical evidence that is crucial to the theoretical understanding of democracy
in the context of transnational environmental governance.
